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Abstract
This paper constructs a political equilibrium in which firms and
unions bargain over wages and workers and capitalists lobby the gov-
ernment for taxation, labor market regulation and immigration policy.
The main findings are the following. It is in the native workers’ in-
terests to ban firms’ direct recruitment from abroad. Otherwise, the
ruling elite captures the surplus of the labor unions by threatening to
allow such recruitment. Legal and illegal immigration coexist and do
not undermine union bargaining power. Because native workers pre-
fer illegal to legal immigration in lobbying, the government tolerates
a higher public-sector marginal cost for illegal than legal immigrants.
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1 Introduction
Does immigration eventually lead to de-unionization? How does it affect
the government’s behavior in a unionized economy? Immigrants benefit the
country through higher output, but cause a financial burden through their
demand for subsidies and public services. It is also widely recognized that
immigration causes political lobbying for the number of foreigners that are
permitted to enter the domestic labor market, in particular when wages are
non-competitively determined.1 To answer the questions, it is instructive to
examine the case in which lobbies representing employers and workers are
able to influence a self-interested government for the exercise of taxation,
labor market regulation and immigration policy.
In many countries, illegal immigration is in fact an institution. Workers
enter the country illegally and surreptitiously, by evading immigration service
inspection. In the country, they are not easily detected and in the case
of detection not deported. On the other hand, illegal immigration is an
expensive institution. When legal and illegal immigrants can work more
or less on the same conditions in the informal or competitive sector and
illegal immigration involves the implementation of border control and cover-
up activities in the country, it would be cheaper for the country as a whole
to import the same amount of labor legally than illegally. This raises the
question of why illegal immigration is at all tolerated. In this study, this
problem is explained by workers’ and employers’ lobbying activity.
According to Berry and Soligo’s (1969) classical result, immigration is wel-
fare enhancing if all markets are competitive and all agents are homogeneous.
Borgas (1995) shows that if the native population is heterogeneous in terms
of wealth distribution, then immigration reduces wages, transfers wealth to
domestic capital owners and enhances welfare for households with relatively
much capital. Schmidt et al. (1994) assume that a nationwide monopoly
1See e.g. Benhabib (1996), Borjas (1994) and Amegashie (2004).
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union of both skilled and unskilled workers sets the wage for unskilled work-
ers, immigrants are unskilled, and the government pays unemployment ben-
efits to both natives and migrants. They show that (i) immigrants replace
native workers and raise unemployment among these, (ii) unemployment
benefits for jobless immigrants strain the government budget, and (iii) the
supply of unskilled labor and the real wages of skilled labor increase. Because
effects (i) and (ii) are negative but (iii) is positive, the overall welfare effect
of immigration is ambiguous. In this study, I assume that the government
can affect union bargaining power through labor market regulation.
Benhabib (1996) constructs a political equilibrium for an economy in
which the natives vote for policies that impose requirements on the immi-
grants. Hillman and Weiss (1999) examine an economy with legal and illegal
immigrants by the specific-factors model where resident population earns
income either as mobile labor or from the ownership of sector-specific capi-
tal. They show that if illegal immigrants consume relatively less non-traded
goods than natives, then the median voter tolerates them but confines them
to the sectors producing non-traded rather than traded goods. In this study,
I assume that the natives vote for whether immigration should be permitted,
before the government chooses immigration quotas.
Myers and Papageorgiou (2000) consider a rich country with a benevolent
government, costly immigration control and a redistributive public sector.
They show that if illegal immigrants have access to the public sector, then
some immigration is permitted, but if they are excluded from the public
sector, then no border controls are enforced. In this study, I introduce a
self-interested government. Fuerst and Thum (2001) construct a model in
which each individual decides first whether it acquires human capital to be-
come an entrepreneur or remains as a low-skilled worker who competes with
immigrates, and then the population decides whether to allow immigration.
In such a model, immigration encourages natives to acquire skills. If union
coverage is constant, then skilled and unskilled labor increase in the same
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proportion and immigration remains neutral with respect to domestic wel-
fare. If union coverage falls with immigration, then union wages fall and total
output and welfare increases. In this atudy, I assume that the government
can decide whether union bargaining power should at all be allowed.
Lobbying can examined either by the all-pay auction model in which the
lobbyist with the higher effort wins with certainty, or themenu-auction model
in which the lobbyists announce their bids contingent on the politician’s ac-
tions..2 Amegashie (2004) uses the all-pay auction model for the case in
which the union and the firm first lobby the government for the immigration
quota and then bargain over the wage of natives. He shows how the reserva-
tion wage of immigrants, the cost of lobbying and the output price of the firm
affect the permissible number of immigrants. Bellettini and Ceroni (2005)
use the menu-auction model for the same purpose as Amegashie. They show
that union power may hurt the workers. In the presence of the union, the
government presses wages down by immigration policy, possibly so much that
equilibrium wages are lower than in the absence of the union. In this study, I
assume that the workers as voters decide whether immigration is permitted.
The government cannot then use immigration policy as a credible threat.
Palokangas (2003) examines lobbying in an economy with union-employer
bargaining by using the menu-auction model, but in a framework of public fi-
nance. He assumes that the workers and employers first agree ex ante on the
type of bargaining, then lobby the government for taxation and labor market
regulation and finally bargain over labor contracts. He shows that workers
and capitalists rule out any bargain over employment, because otherwise the
government would capture all the gain, and the political equilibrium is char-
acterized by strong union power and right-to-manage bargaining. This paper
2In the menu-auction model, it is not possible for a lobbyist to spend money and effort
on lobbying without getting what he lobbied for. In the all-pay auction model, lobbying
expenditures are incurred by all the lobbyists before the politician takes an action. Hence,
there will be winners and losers in this model. Also, if one were to use the many auction
model, one would have to assume that each lobbyist announces a contribution schedule.
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extends that closed-economy model for an open economy with immigration.
The plan of this study is the following. Section 2 presents the institu-
tional background of the model. Section 3 constructs the models of the firms
and the households. Section 4 introduces collective bargaining. The govern-
ment’s behaviour is endogenized in section 5. The political equilibrium of
the economy is constructed in section 6. Finally, section 7 presents policy
rules that explain immigration, taxation and labor market regulation.
2 The setting
In the open economy under consideration, the relative prices of all traded
goods are given from abroad. These goods can therefore be aggregated into
a single good the price of which is normalized at unity. The economy consists
of two sectors. In the formal sector, traded output y is produced from labor
l with decreasing returns to scale, the wage is determined by union-firm
bargaining, income can be taxed and the government observes employment.
In the informal sector, one unit of non-traded output is produced from one
labor unit, income cannot be taxed and firms can hide employment from
the government. The informal-sector wage is then equal to the price p of
the informal-sector good. I assume that the workers consume the outputs of
both sectors but the capitalists only the formal-sector good, for simplicity.3
In the economy, there is a fixed number n of native workers. Immigration
is divided into three categories as follows:
(i) Legal immigration consists workers who enter the country to start com-
peting with native workers for jobs in the formal sector.
(ii) Illegal immigration is comprised of workers who enter the informal sector
from abroad and cannot take a job in the formal sector.
3In this way, the profits do not affect the demand for the informal-sector good which
simplifies aggregation.
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(iii) Direct recruitment from abroad consists of workers who are employed
in the formal sector passing native workers.
I assume that the government permits m legal immigrants, s illegal immi-
grants and k directly recruited workers to enter the country. I assume fur-
thermore that foreign reservation wages are so low relative to domestic wages
that the supply of immigrants always exceeds these government quotas.
In the formal sector, all workers belong to a labor union which bargains
with the employers over the wage. I assume that the government is able to
regulate union bargaining power e.g. by the use of compulsory arbitration.
Government expenditures consist of transfers and public services and they
are financed by the tax t ∈ (−∞, 1) on labor income and the tax θ ∈ (−∞, 1)
on profits. In the theory of optimal taxation it is widely known that if the
government had the opportunity to tax pure profits at no cost, it would op-
timally impose a 100% tax on profits. To eliminate such an unrealistic case
from the model, I assume that the capitalists can conceal their profits, at
some cost. Because all workers (native and immigrant) use public services,
illegal immigration involves border control and workers in the formal and in-
formal sectors may need different public services, I assume that government
expenditures increase with immigration of all types (i) − (iii) and also de-
pend on formal-sector employment. For the reason that the native workers
comprise a vast majority of population, the median voter is a native worker.
I specify the households’ utilities as linear functions of income. This
means that without losing any generality, we can consider the economy as if
there were only one firm and one labor union. The agents acts as players in
the following extensive game:
1. The representative native worker (= the median voter) decides whether
there can be positive quotas for immigration of all types (i)− (iii).
2. The labor union and the capitalist lobby the government for taxation,
labor market regulation (i.e. union power) and immigration quotas.
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3. The government decides on taxation, labor market regulation and im-
migration quotas.
4. The union and the firm bargain over the wage.4
5. The firm chooses its output and employment.
3 Production and income
The formal sector makes its output y with the thrice differentiable function5
y = f(l), f ′ > 0, f ′′ < 0, f(0) = 0. (1)
The profit is given by Π = f(l)−(1+ t)wl, where w is the formal-sector wage
and t the labor-income tax. Profit maximization yields
w = f ′(l)/(1 + t), Π(l) = f(l)− lf ′(l), Π′ = −lf ′′ > 0. (2)
Each worker supplies one labor unit and is employed either in the formal
or informal sector. His utility function is linear in the formal-sector good but
quadratic in the informal-sector good, for simplicity:6
u = I − pr + ηr − (δ/2)r2, (3)
where I is his income, r is his consumption of the informal-sector good,
I − pr his consumption of the formal-sector good (= his income I minus
his expenditure pr on the informal-sector good) and δ and η are positive
4Palokangas (2003) showed by a model rather similar to the one in this paper that
right-to-manage bargaining is the only stable type of bargaining, for the union and the
firm have every incentive to agree ex ante that no bargaining over employment is used.
On the basis of this result, I ignore here the bargaining over employment, for simplicity.
5Alternatively, one could assume that there are constant returns to scale but capital is
fixed. Thrice differentiability is needed for the deduction of the employment function (16)
from the equilibrium condition (14) of wage bargaining.
6In this way, utility is a linear function of income I and the demand for the informal-
sector good does not depend on a worker’s income but depends on the numbers of the
workers of each category.
6
constants. In equilibrium, the price p of the informal-sector good is equal to
the marginal utility for the informal-sector good:
p(r) = ∂u/∂r = η − δr. (4)
Because the utility function (3) is linear in the consumption of the formal-
sector good, all native workers behave as if in the economy there were only
a single native worker the expected wage we. Because, by the equilibrium
condition (4), all n+m+ s+ k workers (both native or immigrant) consume
the same amount r of the informal-sector good, the demand for that good is
equal to (n+m+ s+ k)r. The informal sector employs all n+m+ s+ k− l
workers not employed in the formal sector and produces n +m + s + k − l
units of the informal-sector good. The equilibrium condition for the market
for the informal-sector good is therefore (n+m+ s+k)r = n+m+ s+k− l.
Solving for a worker’s demand for the informal-sector good, r, yields
r = 1− l/(n+m+ s+ k). (5)
A native worker’s probability of being employed in the formal sector is
q
.
=
l − k
n+m
, (6)
where l− k the number of formal-sector jobs available for the native workers
and n + m + k the total number of native workers and legal immigrants.
Noting this probability, a native worker’s expected wage can be written as
we = qw + (1− q)p, (7)
where w (p) is the wage and q (1 − q) his probability of being employed in
the formal (informal) sector.
The capitalist conceals proportion a of his profit Π and reveals the rest,
1 − a, to the government. We suppose furthermore that the scale of profits
does not affect the ability to conceal profits, but that such activity is subject
to increasing cost. The administrative cost of hiding profit, Φ, is therefore
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linearly homogeneous with respect to total profit Π but increasing and strictly
convex with respect to the ratio a of hidden to total profit. It is obvious
that with all profits revealed, a = 0, there is no cost, Φ = 0. Given these
assumptions and (2), we obtain the cost function
Φ = φ(a)Π(l), φ′ > 0, φ′′ > 0, φ(0) = 0, (8)
where φ is the ratio of administrative cost to total profit Π. The government
can only tax observed profit (1− a)Π. By duality, we can define
g(θ)
.
= max
a
[1− (1− a)θ − φ(a)], g′ = a− 1, g′′ > 0. (9)
Subtracting profit taxes θ(1− a)Π and administrative cost (8) from profit Π
and noting (2) and (9), we obtain the capitalist’s income
pi(l, θ)
.
= Π− θ(1− a)Π− φΠ = g(θ)Π(l) with
g′ = a− 1 < 0, g′′ > 0, a(θ) and a′ .= 1/φ′′ > 0. (10)
4 Collective bargaining
I assume the following:
(a) All n native workers belong to a labor union which has an utilitarian
social welfare function with respect to its members.
(b) Employment in the informal sector is so flexible that formal-sector work-
ers can work there even during disputes. This means that the reference
income for the union is equal to the informal-sector wage p.7
7Some papers assume that the expected wage outside the firm is the union’s reference
point, but this is not quite in line with the microfoundations of the alternating offers
game. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986, pp. 177, 185-6) state that the the
reference income should not be identified with the outside option point. Rather, despite
the availability of these options, it remains appropriate to identify the reference income
with the income streams accruing to the parties in the course of the dispute. For example,
if the dispute involves a strike, these income streams are the employee’s income from
temporary work, union strike funds, and similar sources, while the employer’s income
might derive from temporary arrangements that keeps the business running.
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Given the utility function (3), the equilibrium condition (4) and the assump-
tions (a) and (b) above, the union maximizes its members’ additional utility
of being employed in the formal sector:
v = n
(
u
∣∣
I=we
−u∣∣
I=p
)
, (11)
where we is the expected wage in the formal sector and p the informal-sector
wage. Inserting (2)-(7) into (11), the union’s utility function takes the form
v(l,m, k, s, t) = n(we − p) = nq(w − p) = n l − k
n+m
[
f ′(l)
1 + t
− η + δr
]
=
(l − k)n
n+m
[
f ′(l)
1 + t
− η + δ − δl
n+m+ s+ k
]
(12)
with the properties
∂v
∂s
> 0,
∂v
∂t
=
(k − l)n
n+m
f ′
(1 + t)2
< 0,
∂v
∂m
=
∂v
∂s
− v
n+m
<
∂v
∂s
. (13)
The labor union maximizes its utility (12), while the capitalist maximizes
the profit (10) in asymmetric Nash bargaining over the wage w. The out-
come of such bargaining is obtained through maximizing the Generalized
Nash product vαpi1−α by w, where constant α ∈ [0, 1] is the union’s relative
bargaining power. Because the left-hand equation in (2) defines a one-to-one
correspondence from l to w, in the maximization the wage w is replaced by
unionized-sector employment l as the control variable. One can then equiv-
alently maximize an increasing transformation of the product vαpi1−α,
∆(l,m, k, s, t, θ, α)
.
= log
[
vαpi1−α
]
/α = log v(l,m, k, s) + (1/α− 1) log pi(l, θ)
= log(l − k) + log
[
f ′(l)
1 + t
− η + δ − δl
n+m+ s+ k
]
+
( 1
α
− 1
)
log Π(l) +∇,
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by l, where ∇ consists of terms independent of l. This yields
∂∆
∂l
=
( 1
α
− 1
)Π′
Π
+
1
v
∂v
∂l
=
( 1
α
− 1
)Π′(l)
Π(l)
+
1
l − k
+
f ′′(l)/(1 + t)− δ/(n+m+ s+ k)
f ′(l)/(1 + t)− η + δ − δl/(n+m+ s+ k)
=
( 1
α
− 1
)Π′(l)
Π(l)
+
1
l − k +
1
l
+
[f ′′(l)− f ′(l)/l]/(1 + t) + (η − δ)/l
f ′(l)/(1 + t)− η + δ − δl/(n+m+ s+ k) = 0. (14)
Given (2) and (14), the increase in employment l raises the capitalist’s income
but lowers the worker’s:
∂v
∂l
=
(
1− 1
α
)Π′
Π
v < 0. (15)
Furthermore, from (2), (4), (5) and (14) it follows that
f ′′ − f ′/l
1 + t
+
η − δ
l
= (p− w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
[( 1
α
− 1
)Π′
Π
+
1
l − k +
1
l
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0,
∂2∆
∂l∂m
=
∂2∆
∂l∂s
> 0,
∂2∆
∂l∂θ
= 0,
∂2∆
∂l∂α
< 0.
Noting these inequalities and the second-order condition ∂2∆/∂l2 < 0, and
differentiating (14) totally, we obtain the employment function
l(m, k, s, t, α),
∂l
∂s
=
∂l
∂m
.
= − ∂
2∆
∂l∂s
/
∂2∆
∂l2
> 0,
∂l
∂α
< 0. (16)
If union power α decreases or legal and illegal immigration m+ s increases,
then in the formal sector the wage w falls and employment l increases.
5 Public policy
We denote the native worker’s and the capitalist’s contributions by Rw and
Rc respectively. Subtracting Rc from the profit pi yields the capitalist’s con-
sumption Cc. Subtracting Rw from the labor union’s welfare in terms of
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income, v, yields the worker’s consumption Cw. Inserting (7), (10) and (16)
into these definitions, we can specify the differentiable functions
Cw(m, k, s, t, α,Rw)
.
= v
(
l(m, k, s, t, α),m, k, s, t
)−Rw, ∂Cw
∂Rw
= −1,
Cc(m, k, s, t, θ, α,Rc)
.
= pi
(
l(m, k, s, t, α), θ
)−Rc, ∂Cc
∂Rc
= −1. (17)
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), and given (17), we can define the
government’s objective function as follows:
G(m, k, s, t, θ, α,Rw, Rc) = Rw +Rc + βU c(Cc) + γUw(Cw), (18)
where parameters β ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 are the weights given to the welfare of the
capitalist and the native worker, respectively. One might claim that there
is a wholly labor government for β = 0, and a wholly capitalist government
for γ = 0, but even in these extreme cases both classes can maintain their
influence by their contributions, Rw and Rc, to the ruling elite.
Given (2), (10) and (16), we define total tax revenue X, which is the sum
of the labor-income taxes twl and the profit taxes θΠ, as follows:
X(l, t, θ)
.
= twl + θΠ = (1 + t)−1tf ′(l)l + θΠ(l). (19)
I assumed earlier (section 2) that public expenditures E are an increasing
differentiable function of formal-sector employment l, the number of native
workers n, legal immigrants m, illegal immigrants s and directly recruited
immigrants k. Since these expenditures must be covered by taxes, the gov-
ernment’s budget constraint is X ≥ E.8 The representative native worker
decide ex ante on whether there will be legal or illegal immigration or direct
recruitment from abroad. To model this, I define the sets of the feasible
values Ji ∈
{{0}, [0,∞)} for parameters i = m, s, k. The government then
8Since E < X would be a complete waste, any rational government will choose E = X.
We define the budget constraint in the form of inequality to obtain λ ≥ 0 in (28).
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chooses its policy parameters from the set
Γ
.
=
{
(m, k, s, t, θ, α)
∣∣ X(l(m, k, s, t, α), t, θ) ≥ E(l, n,m, s, k),
m ∈ Jm, s ∈ Js, k ∈ Jk
}
. (20)
Now we explore the effects of lobbying by the capitalist and the native
worker on immigration, taxation and labor market regulation, i.e. on vari-
ables (m, k, s, t, θ, α). Following the common practice in the literature on
labor market regulation, I assume that the government can make smooth
and continuous changes in union power.9 The contribution schedule of the
native worker is given by Rw(m, k, s, t, θ, α), and that of the capitalist by
Rc(m, k, s, t, θ, α). The government maximizes its welfare (18) by choosing
(m, k, s, t, θ, α) ∈ Γ. Following proposition 1 of Dixit, Grossman and Help-
man (1997), a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for this game is a set of
contribution schedules Rw∗(m, k, s, t, θ, α) and Rc∗(m, k, s, t, θ, α) and public
policy (m∗, k∗, s∗, t∗, θ∗, α∗) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Contributions are non-negative but less than the income of the contribut-
ing lobby.
(ii) The policy (m∗, k∗, s∗, t∗, θ∗, α∗) maximizes the government’s welfare (18)
taking the contribution schedules as given,
(m∗, k∗, s∗, t∗, θ∗, α∗) ∈
argmax
(m,k,s,t,θ,α)∈Γ
{
G
(
m, k, s, t, θ, α,Rw(m, k, s, t, α), Rc(m, k, s, t, θ, α)
)}
. (21)
(iii) The native worker (capitalist) cannot have a feasible strategy
Rw(m, k, s, t, θ, α)
(
Rc(m, k, s, t, θ, α)
)
that yields him a higher level of utility than in equilibrium, given the gov-
9Cf. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003).
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ernment’s anticipated decision rule,10(
m∗, k∗, s∗, t∗, θ∗, α∗, Ri(m∗, k∗, s∗, t∗, α∗)
)
∈ argmax
(m,k,s,t,θ,α)∈Γ
U i
(
Ci
(
m, k, s, t, θ, α,Ri(m, k, s, t, θ, α)
))
for i = w, c. (22)
(iv) The native worker (capitalist) provides the government at least with the
level of utility that it could get when the native worker (capitalist) offers
nothing Rw = 0 (Rc = 0) and the government responds optimally given the
capitalist’s (native worker’s) contribution function,
G(m, k, s, t, θ, α,Rw(m, k, s, t, θ, α), Rc(m, k, s, t, θ, α))
≥ sup
(m˜,k˜,s˜,t˜,θ˜,α˜)∈Γ
G(m˜, k˜, s˜, t˜, θ˜, α˜, Rw(m˜, k˜, s˜, t˜, θ˜, α˜), 0)),
G(m, k, s, t, θ, α,Rw(m, k, s, t, α), Rc(m, k, s, t, θ, α))
≥ sup
(m˜,k˜,s˜,t˜,θ˜,α˜)∈Γ
G(m˜, k˜, s˜, t˜, θ˜, α˜, 0, Rc(m˜, k˜, s˜, t˜, θ˜, α˜)). (23)
6 The political equilibrium
Given differentiable functions (17), conditions (22) take the form(
m∗, k∗, s∗, t∗, θ∗, α∗, Ri(m∗, k∗, s∗, t∗, θ∗, α∗)
)
∈ argmax
(m,k,s,t,θ,α)∈Γ
Ci
(
m, k, s, t, θ, α,Ri(m, k, s, t, θ, α)
)
for i = w, c (24)
and
∂Cw/∂i = ∂Rw/∂i and ∂Cc/∂i = ∂Rc/∂i for i = m, k, s, t, θ, α, (25)
which says that in equilibrium the change in the worker’s (capitalist’s) contri-
bution due to a change in the instrument equals the effect of the instrument
on the worker’s (capitalist’s) consumption. Thus the contribution schedules
are locally truthful. As in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) or in Grossman
10In this model, the utility of the native worker (capitalist) is independent of his con-
tribution schedule.
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and Helpman (1994), this concept can be extended to a globally truthful con-
tribution schedule. This type of schedule represents the preferences of the
worker (capitalist) at all policy points. From (17), (23) and (25) it follows
that the truthful contribution functions take the form
Rw = max[0, v − v0], Rc = max[0, pi − pi0], (26)
where v0 (pi0) is the worker’s (capitalist’s) income when he does not pay con-
tributions but the government chooses its best response given the capitalist’s
(worker’s) contribution schedule.
The representative native worker is the median voter who chooses the sets
Ji ∈
{{0}, [0,∞)} for variables i = m, s, k. To prove that Jk = {0} holds for
direct recruitment from abroad, k, we assume on the contrary Jk = [0,∞).
The government can then choose any positive quota k for direct recruitment
from abroad. If the union does not pay contributions, Rw = 0, then, the
government sets k = l by k to obtain v0 = v|k=l = 0 [Cf. (12)]. Inserting
this into (26) shows that the union pays all its surplus to the government as
contributions, Rw = v − v0 = v. The native worker then as the member of
the union prefers Jk = {0}.
Proposition 1 In the political equilibrium, there is no direct recruitment
from abroad, Jk = {0} and k = 0.
Because direct recruitment from abroad would be a non-distorting vehicle for
the ruling elite to capture the whole surplus of the labor union, the workers
vote for its abolishment.
7 Policy rules
Given k = 0, the government’s choice set (20) becomes
Γ
.
=
{
(m, s, t, θ, α)
∣∣ X(l(m, 0, s, t, α), t, θ) ≥ E(l(m, 0, s, t, α), n,m, s, 0)}.
(27)
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The conditions (21) take the form that the government’s objective function
(18) must be maximized by (m, s, t, θ, α) subject to the set (27). Given (24),
this is equivalent to maximizing by (m, s, t, θ, α) the function
L =Rw(m, 0, s, t, α) +Rc(m, 0, s, t, θ, α) + βU c(Cc∗) + γUw(Cw∗ )
+ λ
[
X
(
l(m, 0, s, t, α), t, θ
)− E(l(m, 0, s, t, α), n,m, s, 0)], (28)
where, by envelope theorem, Cw∗ and C
c
∗ can be taken to be independent of
t, θ and α. The multiplier λ satisfies the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
λ
[
X
(
l(m, 0, s, t, α), t, θ
)− E(l(m, 0, s, t, α), n,m, s, 0)] = 0, λ ≥ 0.
In equilibrium, the government’s budget constraint must be binding, X = E,
which implies λ > 0.
Noting (17), (25) and (28), we obtain the first-order conditions:
∂L
∂i
=
∂Rw
∂i
+
∂Rc
∂i
+ λ
[
∂X
∂i
+
∂(X − E)
∂l
∂l
∂i
]
=
∂Cw
∂i
+
∂Cc
∂i
+ λ
[
∂X
∂i
+
∂(X − E)
∂l
∂l
∂i
]
=
∂v
∂i
+
∂v
∂l
∂l
∂i
+
∂pi
∂i
+
∂pi
∂l
∂l
∂i
+ λ
[
∂X
∂i
+
∂(X − E)
∂l
∂l
∂i
]
= 0 (i = α, t, θ),
(29)
∂L
∂i
=
∂v
∂i
+
∂v
∂l
∂l
∂i
+
∂pi
∂i
+
∂pi
∂l
∂l
∂i
+ λ
[
∂X
∂i
+
∂(X − E)
∂l
∂l
∂i
− ∂E
∂i
]
= 0
(i = m, s). (30)
Noting (17), the condition (29) for union power α are equivalent to
∂L
∂α
=
[
∂v
∂l
+
∂pi
∂l
+ λ
∂(X − E)
∂l
]
∂l
∂α
= 0,
which yields
∂v
∂l
+
∂pi
∂l
+ λ
∂(X − E)
∂l
= 0. (31)
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Noting k = 0, (10), (13), (16), (17), (19), (20) and (31), the conditions
(29) for taxation (t, θ) are equivalent to
∂L
∂t
=
∂v
∂t
+ λ
∂X
∂t
=
(k − l)nf ′
(n+m)(1 + t)2
+
λf ′l
(1 + t)2
=
f ′l
(1 + t)2
[
λ− n
n+m
]
= 0,
∂L
∂θ
=
∂pi
∂θ
+ λ
∂X
∂θ
= Π[g′ + λ] = Π[a(θ)− 1 + λ] = 0.
From these equations and (13) it follows that
λ =
n
n+m
, a(θ) = 1− λ = m
n+m
, θ(m) with
dθ
dm
=
n/a′
(n+m)2
> 0. (32)
These results can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 2 The capital-income tax θ is an increasing function of legal
immigration m. The labor-income tax t balances the government budget.
Legal immigration decreases the formal-sector wage w, the proportion of
labor income in the tax base and total tax revenue. To compensate this loss
of finance, the government has to increase the capital-income tax θ.
Noting k = 0, (17), (31) and (32), the conditions (29) for immigration
(s,m) are equivalent to
∂L
∂i
=
∂v
∂i
− λ∂E
∂i
=
∂v
∂i
− n
n+m
∂E
∂i
= 0 for i = s,m.
These equations mean that immigration quotas (m, s) are chosen to minimize
the deadweight loss in public finance as follows:
Proposition 3 The government increases legal (illegal) immigration up to
the level at which the marginal increase in the union’s utility due to the em-
ployment of one more legal (illegal) immigrant, ∂v/∂m (∂v/∂s), is in the
fixed proportion n
n+m
to the marginal public expenditure for a legal (illegal)
immigrant, ∂E/∂m (∂E/∂s).
Given (13), this proposition has the following corollary:
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Proposition 4 The government tolerates higher marginal public expenditure
for illegal than legal immigration, ∂E/∂m = ∂v/∂m < ∂v/∂s = ∂E/∂s.
Legal immigration decreases the informal-sector wage, while illegal immigra-
tion increases a native worker’s real income through a lower price p for the
informal-sector good. This provides the labor unions every incentive to lobby
the government for shifting from legal into illegal immigration. Because of
such lobbying, the government tolerates higher marginal cost for illegal than
legal immigrant.
Finally, given (31) and (32), relative union bargaining power α is chosen
to minimize the deadweight loss in public finance as follows:
Proposition 5 The government decreases formal-sector employment l
through labor market regulation (i.e. a higher α) up to the level at which
the marginal increase in the sum of the union’s and the employer’s utilities
due to the employment of one more worker in the formal sector, ∂(v+pi)/∂l,
is in the fixed proportion n
n+m
to the marginal deficit of the government budget
due to it, ∂(E −X)/∂l.
8 Conclusions
This paper examines the political economy of an open economy with immi-
gration in the following five-stage game. First, the native workers decide as
voters whether or not immigration quotas are permitted. Second, the lobbies
representing the native workers and the capitalists offer contributions to the
government to influence taxation, labor market regulation and immigration
quotas. Third, the government decides on taxation, labor market regula-
tion and immigration quotas and collects the corresponding contributions.
Fourth, the unions and firms bargain over wages. Fifth, the firms decide on
production. The results are as follows.
If firms’ direct recruitment from abroad passing native workers is possible,
then the ruling elite supports the unions but captures all union rent by
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threatening to remove recruitment restrictions. Therefore, the native workers
as voters ban such a case and presume that they can equally compete for the
same jobs with immigrants. There are both legal immigrants who can search
a job and work in the formal sector, and illegal immigrants who can work
only in the informal sector. The government determines the optimal levels
for both of these groups as well as relative union bargaining power together
with taxation to even out the deadweight loss in public finance.
Legal immigration tends to increase the capital-income tax as follows.
It decreases the formal-sector wage, the proportion of labor income in the
tax base and total tax revenue. To compensative this, the government must
increase the capital-income tax. Because the illegal immigrants do not com-
pete with native workers in the formal sector and their supply decreases the
price for the informal-sector products and raises the real formal-sector wage,
the native workers benefit from illegal immigration and prefer illegal to legal
immigration in lobbying. For this reason, the government tolerates higher
public-sector marginal cost for illegal than legal immigrants.
While a great deal of caution should be exercised when a highly styl-
ized game-theoretical model is used to draw conclusions about the political
process concerning labor market regulation and immigration quotas, the fol-
lowing judgement nevertheless seems to be justified. Lobbying explains why
(i) the native workers and the government seem to permit illegal immigration
as an institution, (ii) legal and illegal immigration coexist and do not un-
dermine the bargaining power of the labor unions, and (iii) the government
even accepts a higher marginal cost for illegal than legal immigrants.
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